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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 5, 1952

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Luis Quintanilla, Mexican Ambassador to OAS
Walter Thurston, S/P

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY EISCHKE DATE 11/7/83
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1—1493

Ambassador Quintanilla called on me this morning at his request. I had not seen him for many months.

Sr. Quintanilla stated that he and his wife had been invited by Nikolai Vladykin to dine with him recently. On this occasion, Vladykin displayed especial interest in ascertaining Quintanilla's views on two topics: (1) he wondered whether the United States really wants an armistice in Korea, as it looks to him as though we do not; and (2) he expressed the opinion that developments in Egypt seem to indicate that King Farouk was better disposed toward British imperialism than toward Egyptian nationalism.

With respect to (1), Quintanilla stated he had assured Vladykin that in his opinion the United States honestly seeks an armistice in Korea. I told him his opinion was correct. With respect to (2), he said he expressed the view to Vladykin that while Farouk may not incline more favorably toward British imperialism than toward Egyptian nationalism, he feared the latter more than the former and had been frightened by the uprising in Cairo which threatened his regime more than it did that of the British in the Canal Zone.

Quintanilla stated that President Aleman had promised him the Ambassadorship to France but had failed to keep his promise and had given the post to Jimenez O'Farril, he displayed no resentment over this occurrence.

S/P:WThurston:msj

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1 JFG.O.
2 Chrons
1—3 NSC 68
Dept 3/29/54 Jc

January 23, 1952

Mr. Ferguson

Re: British Paper, "Future Policy Towards Soviet Union"

While this British paper has merit as a serious effort to devise action to meet the problem posed, it seems to me to be a feeble effort by comparison with the brilliant presentation contained in NSC 68. The following comment is suggested by the pages cited:

Page 3, para. 6. Mere equilibrium with am opponent whose implacable credo demands the world hegemony cited in paragraph 2, page 1, would be an unworthy as well as an unsafe Western objective. Unworthy because in every category of strength, moral or material, the West possesses or can achieve and must achieve preponderance; and unsafe because the implication of balance is precariousness.

Page 4(c)(i) underestimates the power and the consequences of nationalism in the Middle East and Africa--as current developments there show.

Page 7. It seems to me doubtful that any way is open to us to assert pressure for the purposes listed in (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv).

Page 9(v). No greater blow could be struck against China by Britain at this moment than to withdraw its spurned recognition, accompanied by a denunciation of the Chinese Communist regime.

Page 12, para. 27. The weaknesses mentioned are properly described as potential and no clue is given as to the means by which they might be exploited promptly.

Page 13 B(i). The phrasing of this clause perhaps unconsciously reveals a defect in the present attitude

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of the West in its dealing with the U.S.S.R.--possibly the transparent fear of some of our associates that the West cannot at this time "talk in terms of equality with the Soviet leaders". I would have thought that we could so address them and certainly that we should do so.

ANNEX I, c. It does not seem likely that a united Germany with pro-West inclinations will materialize for some time to come.

d. It also seems unlikely that Sweden will enter NATO at an early date.

e. The entry of U.S. and/or British forces into southern Iran, it seems to be generally agreed, would merely bring Soviet forces into northern Iran. Moreover, the British abandonment of its position of all kinds in Iran would seem to eliminate the grounds upon which such intervention might at one time have been based.

S/P:WThurston:vh

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